College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2014

Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments
George Rutherglen
James Y. Stern
William & Mary Law School, jystern@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Rutherglen, George and Stern, James Y., "Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments" (2014). Faculty
Publications. 1856.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1856

Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Edited by

Paul B. Stephan

BRILL
NIJHOFF
LEIDEN

I BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Foreign court judgments and the United States legal system I edited by Paul B. Stephan.
pages em. -(Sokol colloquium; v. 7)
ISBN 978-90-04-27891-2 (hardback: alk. paper)- ISBN 978-90-04-27892-9 (e-book) !.Judgments,
Foreign-United States. 2. Conflict of laws-Jurisdiction-United States. 3. Hague Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements (2005) I. Stephan, Paul B., editor.
KF8729.F67 2014
347. 73'77-dc23
2014020408

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual 'Brill' typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering
Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities.
For more information, please see brill. com/brill-typeface.
ISSN 1873-6572
ISBN 978-90-04-27891-2

(hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-27892-9 ( e-book)

Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill NY, Lei den, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without prior written permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided
that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive,
Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.

jJ
FSC
www.fsc.org

MIX
Paper from
responsible sources

FSC® C109576

Printed by Printforce, the Netherlands

CHAPTER 1

§(())vereignty, Territoria ity, aJl1ld the JEJl1lfoTfcement
(())f F(())reigJIJljudgment§
George Rutherglen and james Y. Stem

Over the course of the twentieth century, the effect of state boundaries as
hard-and-fast limits on judicial and legislative jurisdiction steadily eroded.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 1 stands as a landmark precedent, replacing traditional requirements that the defendant or the defendant's property be
present in the forum state at the outset of litigation with a regime requiring
only that the defendant have certain minimum contacts" with the forum. 2
That case, concerned with personal jurisdiction over a corporation, was consistent with similar transformations elsewhere: personal jurisdiction over
natural persons, 3 choice oflaw,4 and extraterritorial application of forum statutory law. 5 Altogether, these developments are part of a wider revolution in
jurisdictional practices, which began before World War II with Legal Realism
and continued into the last decades of the twentieth century.
11

* George Rutherglen is the John Barbee Minor Distinguished Professor of Law and Earl

1

K. Shawe Professor of Employment Law at the University of Virginia. James Y. Stern is an
Assistant Professor at the William & Mary Law School.
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (state can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant which
has "certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").

2 Id. at 316.
3 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (nonresident of Delaware did not have the necessary ''minimum contacts" merely by holding stock in a Delaware company unrelated to the

litigation because ''all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe").
4 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (permitting a state to apply its own
law to resolve a dispute so long as the has "a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y. 2d at 481, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963) (New York law
applied based on the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" approach); see generally
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE (2006).
5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 445-447 (2d Cir. 1945).
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To be sure, this revolution produced its own reactionary impulses, reflected
in efforts to salvage various traditional rules confining sovereign power
to national borders and to impose qualifications upon the broadly stated
standards set out in opinions like International Shoe. In widely noted decisions, for example, the Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction based on
presence of the defendant within the forum state 6 and recognized a strong
presumption against extra-territorial application of American law. 7 Yet the
reaction has remained essentially defensive, limiting the expansion of jurisdiction rather than forcing it back. These recent decisions do not question the
vitality of International Shoe, but instead confine themselves to working out its
implications. 8
It may therefore come as something of a shock to discover that strict territorial limits on sovereign power have never been abandoned-in fact, never
seem to have been questioned-as an absolute prerequisite for enforcement
of judgments. Enforcement of a judgment, and especially a foreign judgment,
does not become possible until the defendant or the defendant's property can
be found within the enforcing forum at the onset of enforcement proc~ed
ings. The original adjudicating court (conventionally designated Fl) might be
able to invoke liberal and flexible concepts of judicial and legislative jurisdiction and so reach a wider range of matters than would have traditionally been
possible, but the enforcing court (F2) cannot. Put differently, Fl cannot also
serve as F2 unless it meets standards of presence and territoriality. Presence of
the defendant or the defendant's property within F2 remains a prerequisite for
enforcement of judgments there. Despite a century of erosion and decay in Fl,
the strict territorial theory remains alive and well in F2.
Explanations for this discrepancy nevertheless appear to be readily at
hand. Enforcement of a judgment against property, or against the person of
6 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (finding personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who was personally served with process while temporarily in the state, even if his
presence was unrelated to the litigation).
7 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.1659, 1664 (2013) (presumption against extraterritorial application provides that" [w ]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none").
8 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856-2857 (2011) (defendant did not have "continuous and systematic general business contacts" necessary to support personal jurisdiction with respect to claim that neither arose out of nor related to the
defendant's activities"); J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011)
(opinion of Kennedy,].) (defendant did not "purposefully avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State" even though it might have predicted that its goods
would reach there).
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the defendant, presupposes something or someone within the jurisdiction
that can be seized in order to satisfy the judgment. And only the officers of F2
ordinarily have the authority, or the effective power, to act within the territorial confines of the state, especially in the face of resistance or evasion by the
defendant. The officers of Fl have no such power and any attempt to grant it
to them in F2 requires the latter's consent, seldom forthcoming except on the
most ad hoc basis. The sovereign independence of separate states, and the territorial allocation of power between them, dictates the exclusive control of F2
over the enforcement of judgments within its territory.
The only disquieting note in this seemingly ineluctable reasoning comes
from its disturbing similarity to the rationale in the venerable decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 9 which represents the classic statement of the strict territorial theory of personal jurisdiction that governed before International Shoe.
From the perspective of today's jurisdictional practices, Pennoyer seems to be
mistaken only in transposing the strict requirements of territorial presence
from issues of execution at the end of the lawsuit to those of personal jurisdiction at the beginning. As Chief Justice Stone pointed out in International Shoe,
the jurisdiction of courts was historically ((grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person.... But now that the capias ad respondendum has
given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'10 Arresting the defendant or seizing the defendant's property can await the conclusion of the lawsuit, and if
necessary, enforcement proceedings in F2; these steps are not necessary at the
outset to obtain personal jurisdiction in Fl.
Yet the persistence of the strict territorial theory at the remedial stage of
litigation demonstrates just how robust it is. The deeply embedded nature
of territorial limits on jurisdiction is reflected not only in the nature of execution itself, which perforce must be carried out within the territory of a state
where the object or means of execution is located, but in the processes leading up to it. In particular, a foreign judgment has to be ((domesticated" before

g

10

95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) ("Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when nonresidents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and
appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its
citizens.").
326 U.S. at 316. The common law writ of capias ad respondendum authorized the sheriff
to capture the defendant and bring him to court.
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execution can take place. Absent a treaty or legislation that binds F2, a successful plaintiff in Fl cannot just take the resulting judgment from Fl into F2
for enforcement. The plaintiff must, instead, commence a separate lawsuit in
F2's courts, which then determines the authenticity and the consequences of
the judgment from Fl.11 It is the judgment resulting from such a proceeding in
F2 that will then be enforced. This system could have d~amatic consequences,
potentially transforming enforcement into the tail of litigation, so to speak,
that wags the dog of jurisdiction. If enforcement requires judicial proceedings
in a state wh.ere the defendant or the defendant's property is situated, then
the expansion of adjudicative jurisdiction authorized by International Shoe
amounts to practically nothing-unless the enforcing state either chooses to
or is compelled to treat the adjudicating state's judgment as conclusive.
Nowhere is the survival of territoriality more apparent than with respect
to judgments from foreign nations, where both sovereignty and territoriality
matter far more than in purely domestic cases. This chapter explores the differences between domestic and foreign judgments in three sections. Section 1 distinguishes the special rules applicable to recognition of judgments from sister
states from those applicable to judgments of foreign states. As states within a
strong federal union defined by the Constitution, sister states are bound by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.12 This clause, and supporting legislation, have been
interpreted to require F2 to give Fl judgments the preclusive effect Fl would give
them, almost without exception. This exacting rule of recognition has direct
practical implications f?r the invocation of flexible standards of personal jurisdiction in Fl. It makes those standards in Fl nearly always dispositive in F2, and
it correspondingly diminishes the force of the strict territorial theory applied in
F2 to enforcement of judgments of Fl. If F2 is bound by an Fl judgment, including Fl's determination of the propriety of its own jurisdiction, F2's restrictions
on jurisdiction to enforce judgments make little practical difference. The plaintiff can always go to Fl, invoke the flexible territorial theory there, and then
take the resulting judgment to F2 where the defendant's property is located.
Here the dog wags the tail.
11

States may enact statutes allowing foreign judgments to take effect upon registration,
rather than a full-blown suit on the judgment, but even these statutes still require some
form of domestication and they are in any event for the enacting state to adopt, or not, as
it sees fit. An example of such expedited procedure for enforcement is the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, discussed in the text accompanying notes 51-52
infra.

12

U.S. Const. art. IV; § 1; "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general
laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof."
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Section 2 reviews the standard exceptions for recognition of foreign international judgments and how they open the door to the invocation of F2's
sovereign power based on its territorial control over the defendant and the
defendant's property. The exclusive control that F2 exercises over enforcement
within its boundaries gives its courts the power to engage in review of the judgments of Fl. This implication follows from the principle, given its canonical
statement by Justice Story, that ((whatever force and obligation the laws of one
country have in another depends solely upon the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence and polity and upon its own express or tacit consent."13 Even though recognition of
foreign judgments is the rule rather than the exception, it is a considerably
weaker rule than that applicable between sister states. It gives F2 the opportunity to re-examine the process and the policy underlying the judgment of Fl
for consistency with the principles embodied in the law of F2.
Section 3 then offers a justification for this regime of limited recognition
of foreign judgments derived from the external effects, both detrimental and
beneficial, that result from the judgment of Fl. In a world without strong rules
of international law regulating judicial proceedings, independent sovereigns
have strong reasons to re-examine the balance between the costs and benefits
of enforcing foreign judgments as they have effects within their own territory.
Sovereignty and territoriality determine the need for exceptions to the recognition of foreign judgments, even if they do not determine their precise form
and content. Indeed, the exceptions need not have precise form and content
and may better serve their purpose by generally deterring overenforcement of
foreign judgments by an indefinite threat of nonrecognition.

1

Interstate Versus XntemationaJI. Recognition ofJudgments

Despite some similarities, recognition of sister-state judgments looks very different from the enforcement of foreign-country judgments, particularly in the
narrow range of exceptions that allow nonrecognition. By longstanding interpretation, the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a nearly absolute rule of
interstate recognition of judgments. The leading case is Fauntleroy v. Lum,l4 in

13

Joseph Story; Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: Foreign and Domestic, in REGARD TO
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MAR.ru.AGES,
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND jUDGMENTS § 23 at 24 (1st ed.l834).)

14

210 U.S. 230 (1908) (Missouri judgment entitled to full faith and credit ((as the jurisdiction
of the Missouri court is not open to dispute the judgment cannot be impeached in
Mississippi even if it went upon a misapprehension of the Mississippi law").

18

RUTHERGLEN AND STERN

which the Supreme Court required Mississippi to enforce a Missouri judgment
over the objection that the judgment itself was unconstitutional: that Missouri
had failed to apply Mississippi law to the underlying transaction, in violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Mississippi's position had considerable
force: the dispute that led to the judgment was for gambling debts incurred
in Mississippi in violation of Mississippi law. The Court, however, rejected
Mississippi's attempt to go behind the judgment. Writing for the majority,
Justice Holmes reasoned that the original judgment Cannot be impeached
either in or out of the State by showing that it was based upon a mistake of
law."15 To paraphrase another of his opinions, th ere sometimes has been an
air of benevolent gratuity" in the enforcement of judgments from other states,
but 0f course there is no gratuity about it."16 F2 must treat the judgment of Fl
just as Fl would.
A few exceptions to this Full Faith and Credit rule stand out, but the narrow terms in which they are cast just prove how strong the rule is. There are
the limits on enforcement of judgments concerning penal, tax, and property
issues. Collateral attack for lack of personal jurisdiction allows a defendant to
avoid the effect of a default judgment.17 Yet that exception-which, as it happens, comes from Pennoyer v. Ne./f 8-depends upon the defendant's failure to
appear in Fl. A defendant cannot just attack a judgment for misapplication of
International Shoe. Another flash point for recognition of judgments has to do
with marriage, divorce, and child custody, where a complicated system of rules
has broadened personal jurisdiction to determine marital status but limited
the effects of such judgments with respect to related issues, such as property
settlements, support payments, and child custody.19 ~he current controversy
over recognition of same-sex marriage, legitimated in one state but challenged
in another, is only the most recent example of the special rules for full faith
and credit in domestic relations and "status" cases. Legislation under the Full
11

11

11

. 15
16

Id. at 237.

Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220 (1917) (Holmes,]., dissenting)
(arguing that admiralty courts should apply state law to tort claims arising on navigable
waters).

17

In some circumstances, a judgment can also be attacked based on a lack of subject-matter

18

jurisdiction. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). For the exception for penal, tax,
and property judgments, see notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text.
95 U.S. at 728-729.

19

E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,297 (1942) (marital status can be determined
by a forum that is the marital domicile of one of the parties); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354
U.S. 416, 420 (1957) (wife's right to support cannot be determined without personal
jurisdiction over her).
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Faith and Credit Clause has solved many of these problems (as in litigation
over child custody), 20 and it has raised constitutional questions in others (as in
the litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act). 21
Whatever the scope of these exceptions, they pale beside the dominant rule
of respect for and enforcement of the judgments of sister states articulated
in Fauntleroy. Like several other provisions in Article rv, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was designed to form a more perfect Union" of the states, 22 in
the particular sense of strengthening their bonds beyond those among foreign
nations. 23 As it has been interpreted, this clause supplies a binding rule of law
superior to any rule derived solely from state law, with no analogue in the international context, and that rule is a broad one. 24 To the very considerable extent
Fl's judgment must be given preclusive effect in F2, it is Fl's adjudication that
11

20

21

22
23

24

See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738A (2012) (requiring interstate
recognition of custody and visitation determinations).
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) ("No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons
of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.") Other provisions
of the act limited the meaning of "marriage" in federal law to marriage between a man
and a woman and were declared unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
U.S. Const. preamble.
Recent scholarship would.limit the binding effect of the clause to matters of authentication,
rather than recognition (and the preclusive effect), of sister-state judgments. See Ann
Woolhandler & Michael Collins,]urisdictionalDiscrimination and FulL Faith and Credit, 63
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1029 nn. l6,_17 (2014); Stephen E. Sachs, FulL Faith and Credit in the Early
Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1206-07 (2009). Yet this revisionist interpretation only calls
attention to the difference between interstate and international judgment recognition,
which was appreciated as early as Justice Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws.
See Story, supra note 13, § 609 at 509. On the prevailing interpretation, the two situations
are treated as entirely different because the Constitution deprives F2 of the freedom to
decide how much effect, if any, to give to the judgment of Fl. Even on the revisionist
interpretation, moreover, F2 has a far more limited power to inquire into the authenticity
of Fl judgments from other U.S. states compared with those from other nations. And its
ability to deny recognition to sister-state judgments is in any event subject to whatever
restrictions are imposed from above by Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and perhaps by federal common law as well.
28 U.S. C.§ 1738 (2012) e·such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.").
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is decisive. Regardless of where the defendant or the defendant's property is
situated, Fl's adjudication will carry the day, as long as Fl can satisfy the minimal requirements of International Shoe.
In the international setting, by contrast, enforcing states enjoy significantly
more flexibility and discretion. This latitude is usually described in terms of
licomity," which was given its classic formulation in Hilton v. Guyot, 25 a decision
that refused recognition of a French judgment. The Court defined comity in
the following terms:
ucomity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive C?r judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 26
Comity reserves to each nation the discretion to recognize judgments from
another nation. Even if those judgments typically are enforced, they need
not be. No source of law superior to F2 requires it to recognize the judgments
of Fl. F2 might subject itself to such requirements and dispense with the
rule of comity, for instance, by acceding to a treaty on recognition of foreign
judgments. A treaty brings the international situation closer to the interstate model. 27 Even then, the possibility of unilateral abrogation of the treaty
remains, as does the role of the courts in the enforcing state as the final arbiter
of the effect of a foreign judgment, typically without review by any other tribunal. In the absence of a treaty, comity serves as a residual source of power
in F2 to reexamine the judgments of Fl. Even if those judgments typically are
enforced by F2, they need not be.
The difference between interstate and international recognition of judgments has immediate consequences for the effect of Fl's own standards for
exercising jurisdiction. In the interstate situation, so long as Fl exercises jurisdiction within wide constitutional boundaries, it does not matter where in the
United States a prevailing party seeks to enforce the resulting judgment. Fl's
finding of personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction, not to say its

25
26

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Id. at 164.

27

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements [official compilation]; Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [official compilation].
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decision on the merits, must itself be given ~~full faith and credit" by F2. 28 Any
money judgment can be enforced in any state in which the judgment debtor's
property can be found. It does not matter that the enforcement action in F2
remains subject to the strict territorial restraints of Pennoyerv. Neff. 29 The generous and open-ended standards of International Shoe determine the jurisdiction of Fl, 30 and with it, the enforceability of Fl's judgment.
No such simple consequences, however, follow from issuance of a foreign
judgment or from a foreign court's determination that it has jurisdiction. F2
can re-examine these determinations, indirectly giving effect to the territorial
limits on enforcement of judgments as a restraint on Fl's exercise of jurisdiction. The current version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act (UF-CMJRA) makes such re-examination central to recogni- ·
tion of foreign judgments.31 Section 5 of the Act identifies several situations in
which F2 must accept the personal jurisdiction of Fl, but Fl's conclusion that
its exercise of jurisdiction was proper is conspicuously absent from the list. 32
There is no bar to relitigating the question of personal jurisdiction, even if Fl
and F2 apply the same standards to assess personaljurisdiction. 33 Nor is F2's
ability to review Fl's judgment limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction.
F2 can go further and re-examine other procedural and jurisdictional issues
raised in Fl and, to a considerable extent, the substance of Fl's judgment. 34 All
of these grounds for nonrecognition create further doubt and uncertainty over
the plaintiff's initial choice ofFl as a court with jurisdiction over the defendant.
z8

29

30

31

32
33

34

Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963) (judgment must be given full faith and credit on
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction if it was fully and fairly litigated and finally decided by
the court that rendered the original judgment); Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522,526 (1931) (same for issue of personal jurisdiction).
95 U.S. at 720. ("The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond
those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an
illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.").
326 U.S. at 317 (observing that uthe terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process").
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act of 2005 § 4(b)(2), (3).
The earlier version of the Act contained nearly identical provisions. Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 § 4.
UF-CMJRA § 5.
Agnitsch v. Process Specialists, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (re-examining
foreign judgment to determine if F1 had personal jurisdiction under F2's five-factor test
for minimum contacts).
Id. § 4(b)(1), (c).
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The holder of a judgment from a foreign nation stands in what appears to be a
significantly weaker position than the holder of a judgment from a sister state.

2

The Distinctive Features of Foreig:nJudgments

The difference between the enforcement of domestic and foreign judgments
are, at the same time, fundamental and elusive-fundamental because they
reflect enduring limits on national sovereignty, but elusive because American
law follows a presumption in favor of recognition of foreign judgments. The
formal difference between full faith and credit as a constitutional requirement and the exercise of discretion as a matter of comity goes back to the
seminal decision in Hilton v. Guyot35 and is carried forward in modern statutes, like the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
(UF-CMJRA). 36 The presumption in favor of recognition of foreign judgments
can be overcome when a case falls within any of several exceptions, most of
them inapplicable to interstate judgments under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 37 Yet these exceptions make a difference only in comparatively few
cases, which raises the question why they should be retained at all. Why not
treat international cases just like interstate cases? A look at the nature of the
exceptions-theoretically broad, if practically limited-provides an answer to
this question.
_The most prominent exception is for judgments inconsistent with the
enforcing forum's public policy. That exception can become a serious irritant
in relations with foreign countries, as illustrated in the United States by the
SPEECH Act of 2010,3 8 which forbids enforcement of defamation judgments
from nations, notoriously, the United Kingdom, which view rights to freedom
of speech more narrowly than American law. Yet for all their intensity, the
35

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1895) (French judgment not recognized because
France did not grant reciprocal recognition to American judgments) '"Comity,' in the legal
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other." Unless provided for by a treaty "there is no obligation,
recognized by legislators, public authorities, and publicists, to regard foreign laws; but

36

their application is admitted only from considerations of utility and the mutual
convenience of States ... ."Id. at 214.
See UF-CMJRA § 4( c )(3) ("a court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if the foreign-country judgment or the [claim] on which the foreign-country
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States.").

37
38

See supra note 14.
28 u.s.c. §§ 4101-05.
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occasions for invoking the public policy exception are surprisingly narrow. 39
Differences in public policy have to rise to the level of severe inconsistency to
trigger this exception. It stands less as a regularly invoked exception and more
for the general vulnerability of foreign judgments to re-examination under the
discretionary regime of comity.
The discretion evident in the public policy exception reappears in the variety and open texture of the other exceptions to recognition, which generate
more litigation. Lack of personal jurisdiction in Fl is prominent among them,
and it blends imperceptibly into general procedural concerns, most accommodated comfortably under the general heading of udue process." So, for instance,
American courts tend to re-examine the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a
foreign court-even if, in the end, they seldom refuse recognition of a foreign
judgment on this ground, typically finding sufficient contacts for jurisdiction
under a combination of foreign, domestic, and internationallaw.40
A quick survey of the UF-CMJRA reveals the range and flexibility of the
other exceptions to recognition, which constitute standards rather than rules,
and which empower as much as they circumscribe judicial discretion. Almost
all the remaining exceptions concern issues of procedure: denial of due process, lack of personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction, inadequate
notice, fraud in obtaining the judgment, inconsistency with another final judgment, failure to adhere to a forum selection clause, or forum non conveniens.41
The Uniform Act departs from these general categories of nonrecognition, all
of which depend heavily upon prior judicial decisions, only in specifying several grounds sufficient for finding personal jurisdiction. These, too, however,
have their source in judicial decisions recognizing presence or consent as a
basis for personal jurisdiction.42 In effect, as well as in form, these provisions
operate more as a restatement of existing law rather than as a freestanding
statutory innovation. To the extent they make changes, these are variations
39

RONALD A. BRAND, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 21 (Federal
Judicial Center) (2012) (courts "seldom deny" recognition of judgments on this ground);
see Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,111 (1918) (courts refuse to recognize claims
11

based on law of another jurisdiction only when help would violate some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
40

tradition of the common weal").
See, e.g., Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 135, 141-48 (1st Cir. 2010)
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law of personal jurisdiction).
See UF-CMJRA § 4( a) (mandatory grounds for nonrecognition); id. § 4(b) (discretionary

(applying Massachusetts version of UF-CMJRA and both foreign law and Massachusetts

grounds for nonrecognition).
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!d. at § 5( a).
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on themes already sounded in judicial decisions. The same can be said of the
federal statute proposed by the American Law Institute.43 The ALI statute, for
instance, differs from the uniform act in reinstating the requirement of reciprocity first articulated in American law in Hilton v. Guyot44 and in requiring
more than the defendant's transitory presence within the forum as a basis for
personal jurisdiction,45 thus going beyond what is required under Burnham v.
Superior Court. 46

Both the legislation and the case law defy efforts at simple summary or
analysis, since several different grounds are specified that either require nonrecognition, permit nonrecognition, or are insufficient for either. Sections 4( a),
4(b ), and 5( a) of the UF-CMJRA deal respectively with each of these issues,
by subdividing them into more specific grounds for recognition or nonrecognition. The rationale for all these separate provisions is best captured in one
subdivision of the ALI's proposed statute: it states that a judgment cannot be
recognized if it ((was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial and justifiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment in question." 47 This provision serves as a kind of catch-all and reflects the
overall degree of suspicion that must attach to a foreign judgment to prevent
it from being recognized. When Fl is foreign, F2 has considerable discretion to
deny recognition and enforcement of Fl's judgment, even if it seldom does so.
There are some ways in which F2's power of re-examination might be
avoided. Fl might issue an injunction concerning a defendant's behavior in
F2, but its enforceability will depend on the defendant at some point being
present in Fl; sanctions for contempt invariably are issued only by Fl and
can take effect only within its boundaries.48 The academic literature offers a
theory that supplies another possible means to circumvent F2's discretion to
deny recognition. In this view, a judgment creditor can work around states that
are more reluctant to recognize foreign judgments by going to states that are
less reluctant, and then taking the resulting state judgment and arguing that
it is entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution and under the state

43
44
45
46

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN jUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE§ 7(a) (2005) (ALI Proposal).
See supra note 26.
ALI Proposal § 6( a)(iv).
See supra note 6.

47
48

ALI Proposal§ 4(a)(ii).
Bakerv. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,238-40 (1998).
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and federal laws facilitating recognition of judgments from other states.49 In
schematic terms, Fl is a foreign nation; its judgment is taken to F2, a state that
liberally recognizes foreign judgments; and then F2's judgment is taken to F3, a
state that has a more restrictive policy but is bound by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Only the step from Fl to F2 requires resort to the UF-CMJRA (or in states
without the model statute, to related common law doctrines). The step from F2
to F3 can rely on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and implementing statutes.
This argument depends upon the crucial assumption that the applicable
law allows this form of 'Judgment-laundering," not just as a matter of theory
but as a matter of practice. At the federal level, so the argument goes, a statute restates and extends the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 5°
and a related statute provides for registration of federal judgments from any
federal district in any other, 51 enabling a prevailing plaintiff in federal court to
obtain a form of nationwide enforcement. At the state level, another uniform
act, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), 52 provides
for expedited enforcement of judgments from one state in another state. In
theory, these statutes support the step from F2-a federal or state court that
recognizes a genuinely foreign judgment-to F3 for enforcement-in another
federal district or another state. As a matter of full faith and credit, F3 must
recognize the judgment from F2 despite the origins of that judgment in the
foreign country of Fl.
This is a formally valid line of reasoning, and it has been widely recommended as a tactic for enforcing judgment from other nations. 53 Yet this practice has few reported decisions to support it, and the same hesitation that
attaches to recognition of a foreign judgment in F2 would also attach to recognition in F3. Much more common has been the resort to the federal registration statute or the UEFJA to provide procedures for authenticating judgments
from foreign nations and specifying the means, once recognized, by which
they might be enforced, either in F2 or F3. 54 Wholesale departures from the
49

so
51
52

53
54

Gregory H. Shill, Ending judgment Arbitrage: jurisdictional Competition and the
Enforcement ofForeign Money judgments in the United States, 54 HARv. INT'L L.J. 459, 470
& n. 43 (2013); John P. Bellinger, III, Recognition of Foreign Judgments: Balancing
International, Federal, State, ~nd Commercial Interests at 6 (2012).)
28 u.sc. § 1738 (2006).
Id. § 1963.
13 U.L.A. 261 (1981). Notwithstanding its name, this act applies only to sister-state
judgments, which are "foreign" only in the sense that they come from another state. It has
no application as an initial matter to foreign judgments.
Shill, supra note 49, at 470.
Brand, supra note 39, at 5 & n. 19.
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traditional exceptions to recognition of judgments from foreign nations have
yet to be thoroughly documented.
A third way in which the territorial restrictions on enforcement might be
skirted is to avoid going after the defendant's person or property. It is possible for recognition of a judgment, as opposed to enforcement, to be sought
without any prospect of enforcement (assuming F2 satisfies the requirements
of personal jurisdiction). A defendant, for instance, could seek recognition of
a judgment in F2, in order to bar further litigation after prevailing on the
merits in Fl. But the usefulness of such proceedings is very limited. Sooner
or later, collecting on a judgment requires property which can be seized and
sold in satisfaction of the judgment. Only the officers of the state where the
property is located have this authority. There is one reported case, from New
York, allowing an enforcement action in anticipation of the defendant bringing property into the state, but its reasoning still depends upon presence of
property within the state, albeit at a future point in time. 55 If the property were
never to arrive, the New York judgment would be of little use. The opportunity for plaintiffs to engage in foreign shopping for purposes of enforcement
remains circumscribed by the location of the ·defendant's assets. Unlike judgments from another state, those from a foreign nation do not automatically
receive faith and credit to gain enforcement wherever the defendant's property
might be found. They must both satisfy the requirement that the defendant's
property be present and avoid coming within any exception to enforcement
provided by local law.
The real question is not whether F2's role in the enforcement process can
somehow be evaded, but just what the effects of the exceptions to recognition
in F2 are. How high are the hurdles that they pose to enforcement of foreign
judgments? The answer appears to be, not prohibitively, so that most plaintiffs can take precautions to assure enforcement of a foreign judgment in the
United States. 56 The plaintiff has to exercise some care in choosing Fl to make
sure that its judgments regularly are recognized in F2; that the grounds for personal and subject-matter jurisdiction are not too exorbitant, that the relevant
public policies of Fl and F2 are not completely at odds; and in general, that
F2 can trust the reliability of the judgment of Fl. The plaintiff must still bear
the costs resulting from the uncertainty of enforcement and from complicating a collection action into a form of international civil litigation. No matter
55
56

Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42, 50, 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (4th Dep't 2001).
Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALL· Herein of
Foreign Country judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J.
635, 638-397 (2000).
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how liberal the attitude that F2 takes towards recognition of judgments from
other nations, it can still insist on re-examining the substance and procedure
of the judgment from Fl. Countries concede the power to give unexamined
effect to a foreign judgment only by way of treaty or by joining a federal union.
The case-by-case review of foreign judgments encouraged by the concept of
comity allows them to preserve the sovereign power that otherwise might be
ceded to the courts of another country.
Ohno v. Yasuma, 57 a recent decision, is representative in terms of both process and result. The case concerned a plaintiff who brought an action in Japan
against a church, alleging that it defrauded her of assets worth half a million
dollars. The Japanese court issued a judgment in her favor, which she then
sought to enforce in federal court in California. Because federal jurisdiction
was based on diversity of citizenship, the court applied the California version
of the UF-CMJRA. The defendants argued against recognition on grounds of
public policy and because the judgment violated the Free Exercise Clause. The
court rejected both arguments, but only after a close comparison of Japanese
law with California law and the requirements of the First Amendment. Neither
of these grounds for challenging the judgment would have been available if the
judgment had come from a sister state.
The costs of re-examination vary with the location of the defendant's assets,
since.that determines which nation or which state can serve as a forum for
enforcement. Within the United States, state law determines the enforceability of judgments from other countries in the absence of a treaty or a federal
statute. 5 8 The presence of the judgment debtor's property within a state's territory remains an unquestioned prerequisite to enforcement in F2, and for
that reason, it determines which state's law supplies the exceptions to the presumption in favor of enforcing Fl's judgment. State boundaries therefore set
definite limits that, in turn, set upper and lower bounds to the indefinite costs
of uncertainty and complexity borne by the plaintiff. Other definite restrictions on enforcement also come into play. Only money judgments, and only
those that do not involve penal or tax claims, are entitled to recognition. These
restrictions, too, determine the plaintiff's strategy in framing the underlying
claims in Fl.
These barriers are not insignificant, but they are less than overwhelming for
litigants in the mine run of cases. The prevailing regime for the enforcement
57
58

723 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2013).
Another possible exception concerns the existence of a federal claim in F2, which would
rarely be made in an action solely to enforce a foreign judgment. See · RussELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 746-47 (5th ed. 2006).
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of foreign judgments is nuanced and its effects must, it seems, be subtle. The
question that remains, then, is just what role territorial restrictions play in
the judgment enforcement context and whether that role can be justified.

3

l'he System of l'enitorial Sovereignty

In this section, we seek to uncover the theoretical underpinnings of the
approach to enforcement of judgments followed in both domestic and international cases. This approach is founded, we believe, on widely shared concepts
of territorial sovereignty, deeply embedded in the conception of the modern
nation state as the ultimate arbiter of the use of force within its boundaries.
Our purpose is not to defend what we believe to be a very familiar regime, but
to describe it and to draw out its implications for enforcement of judgments.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, attempts to minimize the
role of territorial thinking have been inspired by frustration with formal modes
of legal analysis, .belief in social progress, and cosmopolitan impulses. Yet
territorialism proved to be more resilient than many evidently expected and
still remains a cornerstone of legal ordering. Consider International Shoe,
sometimes interpreted as a case replacing territorialism with a ~~functional
approach" 59 International Shoe did away with the requirement that a defendant be present within the territory of the adjudicating state at the time litigation commences, but its alternative requirement-that the defendant have
minimum contacts with the state-is still an essentially territorial principle.
A defendant must interact or have interacted with the state in some fashion, typically by having been present or causing something to enter or occur
within the territory of the state in the course of the events giving rise to the suit.
Territory defines both the state as an entity and the scope of the interests that
support its coercive actions. The Supreme Court subsequently made this clear
by emphasizing, as it had in International Shoe, that the Due Process Clause
~~does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." 60
And even when the defendant has contacts with the state, it is hard to avoid
the' conclusion that some are more salient in the mind and more significant
in the law than others. The many decisions elaborating on the standards of
59

ARTHUR VON MEHREN AND DONALD TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS:
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651 (1965).
326 U.S. at 319; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
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International Shoe make this clear. Thus the movement of the defendant's customer or the defendant's product into the forum state does not, by itself, provide a constitutionally sufficient contact to justify the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. 61 On matters of enforcement, one state cannot send its officers
into another with authority to enforce its judgments without the consent
of the second state. Once they cross state lines, they become no more than
private citizens within the territory of the second state. It is the place where
the officer acts, not the ultimate purpose of the officer's actions, that counts.
Similarly, to take an example from the criminal side, apprehension and extradition by the officers of another state, rather than kidnapping by the officers
of the forum state, provides the usual basis for acquiring jurisdiction over the
defendant and bringing him across state lines. 62
All of this is to say that territorial sovereignty matters a great deal jn litigation and it matters most when a court exercises its coercive power to enforce
a judgment. If "[t ]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," as Holmes
observed, then execution ofjudgments is the exercise of physical power itself. 63
At that point in litigation, the state's monopoly on the use of coercion and
force becomes most important, excluding both private opposition and the
interference of other states. For intensely practical reasons-not just as a
matter of logic or formalism-the domain in which one state enforces judgments must not be allowed to overlap with the domain of another. In theory,
those domains might not be defined territorially, but for the modern state, they
almost invariably are. Even in federal systems, in which two levels of government exercise power over the same territory, rules of priority and supremacy
dictate that enforcement efforts remain consistent with one another. State and
federal courts within the United States, for instance, basically follow the rules
of state law in enforcing money judgments, and where there are conflicting
enforcement efforts by state and federal courts, federal law generally gives priority to the court first asserting power over a res. 64 By a combination of deference to state law and its own inherent supremacy, federal law yields a single,
consistent resolution of any questions over enforcement of judgments within
the territory of the United States.
The principles that govern enforcement of foreign judgments are part and
parcel of this system. Start with the requirement that a judgment be domesticated before it can be enforced. Simply put, within a system of territorially
~1
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World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 295-96.
U.S. Const. art. rv, § 2.
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
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defined states, a state has a paramount interest in the operation of law within
its borders. Viewed in formal terms, one might say-as Justice Story did-that
one sovereign's judgment cannot itself .have any effect within the territory of
another; it is foreign law and inapplicable of its own force. Framed in more
pragmatic terms, a state's interest in its own territory takes precedence over
the interest of any other state, and it must therefore have the opportunity to
review legal edicts to be given effect within its boundaries or recognized as
authority that its officers must obey.
Similar thinking helps explain the reluctance to punish violations of injunctions issued by other states. 65 Several different arguments support the refusal
to enforce injunctions, but they all revolve around the need to coerce the defendant by means of a citation for contempt. According to a longstanding maxim,
equity acts only upon the person of the defendant; 66 the issuing court's authority is limited to citations for contempt against the defendant within its own territory (even if the defendant's violation of the injunction occurred elsewhere);
and equitable decrees remain subject to amendment, so that they never
achieve the degree of finality of money judgments. 67 Even the ALI Proposal,
which generally supports recognition of foreign injunctions, allows only that
they may be entitled to recognition or enforcement under such procedures
as the recognizing court deems appropriate." 68 Continuing supervision of the
defendant's compliance with the injunction exacts costs upon the courts of
F2 that they might not be willing to bear and a citation for contempt can lead
directly to the exercise of physical coercion against the defendant. Instead of
a presumption in favor of enforcement of F2, injunctions face the nearly universal practice of not being enforced at all outside of Fl. Hence statutes like
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, as its name implies,
·
covers only money judgments. 69
A similar reluctance underlies the well-established, ~f often-criticized,
exceptions to the enforcement of foreign tax, penal, and criminal laws, and to
recognition of judgments based upon those laws. The closer the adjudication
11
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Bakerv. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,238-40 (1998).
Douglas Laycock, Modem American Remedies: Cases and Materials 275, 819 (4th ed.
2010) (equitable remedies can be used to coerce defendant within the forum to do acts
outside it).
!d. at 342-46 (summarizing grounds for modification of injunctions).
ALI Proposal, supra note 45, § 2(a)(ii).
The enforcement of federal injunctions in any federal judicial district under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(1)(b) does constitute a counterexample to this proposition. It instead
confirms it because each such district is within the territorial limits of the same sovereign.
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of another state or nation comes to core issues of sovereignty, the less likely it is
to receive enforcement or recognition elsewhere, not only because reflexively
enforcing the acts of another government threatens to reduce the sovereign
independence of the enforcer, but also because it may appear as a usurpation
of the sovereign prerogatives of the government whose act is to be enforced by
another. 70 These hard-and-fast restrictions on the effect of foreign judgments
reveal in their stark terms the rationale that underlies the other, open-ended
exceptions to recognition: nations remain reluctant to concede the essential
·attributes of sovereignty for fear that they might be lost forever. Case-by-case
re-examination of foreign judgments protects against the loss of sovereignty
by attrition.
Rules restricting jurisdiction over property coincide with and reinforce the
territorial limits on enforcement of judgments, partly because of the special
importance of property in the context of recovering money damages, but also
because of the multifaceted way in which authority over property relates to
jurisdiction. There are really three separate justifications for the long-standing
doctrinal proposition that a state cannot affect title to property situated elsewhere. First, the ability to adjudicate interests in property elsewhere would
enable Fl to take a large step in the direction of actual enforcement in F2.
Sooner or later, a plaintiff seeking to recover money damages must identify
specific assets of the defendant to be liquidated, so that the proceeds may then
be transferred to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the obligation created by the
judgment against the defendant. Fl can only declare its judgments as generalized, personal obligations, but cannot reduce them to the physical transfer of
property by the use of force in F2, which would create the risk of outright conflict between the officers of two sovereign states. Preserving exclusive jurisdiction over property also preserves each state's monopoly over the use of force.
The second set of arguments for F2's exclusive authority over property
rests on the wide array of weighty interests a state has in property situated
locally. For a territorially defined state, local property is something close to the
sum total of whatever happens to be within its territory-the contents of
the territory. The relationship between property and sovereignty is especially
strong for real property, which resembles territorial sovereignty to the extent it,
too, is a system for the allocation of physical space. 71 Not surprisingly, control
70
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over domestic property has profound practical consequences for states.
The use of property typically affects the local community, rules governing the
transfer and scope of property rights affect local markets, and the way ownership of property is held within a given jurisdiction affects both the distribution
of wealth and the tax base that helps sustain the government. The brevity of
this description should not obscure the significance of the concerns described,
which are genuinely fundamental. This is not to say a singular incursion
in which one state acts on property within another will always jeopardize these
interests in a serious way, but the overall picture is clear enough: the principle
of territorially exclusive jurisdiction over property can be justified as a general
matter in terms of a state's interests as a sovereign and thus in the preservation
of its sovereignty.
A distinct and final way in which territorial sovereignty supports nonrecognition of foreign judgments concerning property is the way in which
this territorial limitation furthers the state's separate interest in maintaining a
stable and effective system of property law. We refer here not to the state's role
in protecting against the violation of property rights-protection against trespass, theft, and the like-but to the state's role in titling property, in keeping
track of who has what claims on which assets. Entitlements within a property
system are mutually exclusive, in the sense that if Alice owns Blackacre, Bill
cannot also do so, unless he acquires it from her. This structure presents special
complexities not faced in other branches of basic private law. To secure property in the face of these complications, a government must, at the very least,
maintain a system of property law offering a reasonably clear set of rules that
allow title to be determined, and with valuable, mobile, or intangible assets, it
is frequently necessary either to establish a system to store evidence of title or
maintain an actual registry that conclusively determines rights in a given asset
at any point in time. Providing the means to keep track of property rights is a
vital sovereign function. Indeed, the economist Hernando de Soto lays much
of the blame for stagnation in the developing world on the failure of governments there to support formal titling of property; in his account, titling is the
key to the prosperity of Western economies. 72
Because one person's property rights come at the expense of all other legal
actors, secure titling depends on exclusive jurisdiction. Having multiple states
declare title to the same asset threatens serious confusion and uncertainty and,
indeed, potentially conflicts with the very idea of title itself, in the sense of a
definitive resolution of mutually exclusive claims. In consequence, observes
72
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Benito Arruiiada, a Jll kinds of recorders and registries are therefore organized as territorial public monopolies when they produce evidence or directly
decide on property rights." 73 Arruiiada notes the ubiquity of single title registries, in contexts ranging from ownership of stock shares to internet domains. 74
The point is that f~H any given asset, one and only source of title can be in
place. For a system of territorially organized sovereigns charged with overseeing these questions of title, the natural point of departure is the location of the
asset to be titled. One would not imagine that the deed to a house situated in
Essex County, Massachusetts, would be found at the courthouse in Okmulgee
County, Oklahoma. By the same token, judgments operating directly on title
to the property should not issue from a court in Okmulgee County. In this way,
sovereignty, territorialism and property are again linked in a way that helps
account for limitations on the recognition of foreign judgments.
Finally, we turn to the collection of general exceptions to judgment recognition discussed in Section 2. Quite apart from the ·considerations supporting
the specific limitations on judgment enforcement for core sovereign concerns like penal legislation and property titles, a system of territorial sovereignty lends support for something like the system of retail-level scrutiny of
foreign judgments that current law establishes. In particular, the territorial
basis for enforcement in F2 offers a general check on the abusive exercise of
jurisdiction-and of decisions on the merits-in Fl. For the same reason, it
also provides a check on the plaintiff's initial choice of forum whenever the
plaintiff's property cannot be found there. No matter how likely it is that the
plaintiff will obtain a judgment in Fl, the plaintiff can recover on the judgment
only if F2 is willing to enforce it. In either case, territorial limits on enforcement exercise a powerful influence over the plaintiff's choice of forum.
These territorial limits have theoretical, as well as practical implications. In
particular, they shed some light on the similarities and differences between
recognition of judgments in the interstate and international contexts. So long
as recognition of judgments operates within the boundaries of a single national
sovereign, as it does in interstate cases, the rule of recognition functions with
a minimum of judicial discretion. Territoriality defines both the scope of juris-:diction for enforcement and the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
National sovereignty supports supervening national law that governs the
proceedings of courts in component states. That law might be more flexible
[
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than existing American law, as it is in the European Union, which forbids recognition of a judgment ~~manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member
State in which recognition is sought." 75 Yet it operates in the same way to limit
the discretion of the enforcing court to refuse recognition. Comity has little
place in the internal relations between sister states subject to a single national
sovereign. To the extent that the European Union approaches the status of a
single sovereign, its provisions for recognition of judgments become comparably strict. This consequence results from the desirability both of reducing
friction between member states and imposing a degree of uniformity upon
proceedings within them. It serves the general purpose of bringing the separate states within a federal union into conformity with the requirements of a
single national sovereign.

4

Conclusion

For domestic judgments, it is national law produced by the formation of single
sovereignty that determines the rules of recognition of judgments, the minimum standards for asserting personal jurisdiction, and the power of a national
supreme court to assure conformity with those standards. All these rules apply
of their own force only within the boundaries of the nation state, and each
reinforces the effectiveness of the other. Rules of personal jurisdiction supply
the necessary prerequisite for the enforcement of judgments; recognition of
judgments from other states supports their exercise of personal jurisdiction;
and review by a supreme court with national jurisdiction enforces both sets
of standards. The need for internal conformity within a federal union gives
greater significance to its external boundaries. Judgments rendered outside
those boundaries can be enforced within it only as a matter of comity or by
the obligations of a treaty. Enforcement of a foreign judgment has no effect, in
and of itself, within the boundaries of another sovereign where the property
or the person of the defendant may be found. In this respect, territoriality is
inescapable, and will remain so as long as the power of courts depends upon
the power of the nation state.
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